LogsDiller Cloud_Free_485_70 uploaded by a Telegram User

Our threat intelligence platform flagged an unusual data dump on December 8th, 2025, originating from a Telegram channel. We noticed the file, titled "LogsDiller Cloud_Free_485_70," contained a significant volume of credential material. What struck us immediately was the raw, unredacted nature of the passwords within the log, suggesting a direct exfiltration from compromised endpoints rather than a targeted database breach. The metadata indicated the log was likely generated by a credential stealer malware.

The "LogsDiller Cloud_Free_485_70" file, uploaded by an anonymous Telegram user, represents a significant exposure of 7,612 records. Analysis of the log reveals a consistent structure, detailing compromised endpoints, associated email addresses, API hostnames, and critically, plaintext passwords. This type of data is highly indicative of a stealer malware infection, where malicious software on user machines actively harvests credentials from browsers and other applications. The presence of API hostnames suggests potential access to cloud services or third-party integrations, amplifying the risk beyond individual user accounts. The leak location, a public Telegram channel, signifies a broad dissemination and immediate availability to malicious actors.

While this specific Telegram upload has not garnered widespread news coverage, the methodology aligns with a growing trend of credential stealer logs appearing on informal data leak platforms. Security researchers have repeatedly documented the proliferation of such malware families, which often target specific user behaviors and software. The ease with which these logs can be shared on platforms like Telegram bypasses traditional data breach notification channels, making proactive threat hunting and endpoint security paramount. The potential for these exposed credentials to be used in credential stuffing attacks against other services remains a significant concern.

Email · Addresses · Plaintext · Password · Urls